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Abstract— In a P2P system, a client peer may select
one or more server peers to download a specific file. In
a P2P resource economy, the server peers charge the
client for the downloading. A server peer’s price would
naturally depend on the specific object being downloaded,
the duration of the download, and the rate at which
the download is to occur. The optimal peer selection
problem is to select, from the set of peers that have
the desired object, the subset of peers and download
rates that minimizes cost. In this paper we examine
a number of natural peer selection problems for both
P2P downloading and P2P streaming. For downloading,
we obtain the optimal solution for minimizing the
download delay subject to a budget constraint, as
well as the corresponding Nash equilibrium. For the
streaming problem, we obtain a solution that minimizes
cost subject to continuous playback while allowing for
one or more server peers to fail during the streaming
process. The methodologies developed in this paper are
applicable to a variety of P2P resource economy problems.
Keywords — Economics, Mathematical Program-
ming/optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today many computers participate in peer-to-peer file
sharing applications in which widely distributed nodes
contribute storage and bandwidth resources [1], [2], [3],
[4]. It is widely documented, however, that these P2P
systems are havens for “free riders”: a significant fraction
of users do not contribute any significant resources, and
a minute fraction of users contribute the majority of the
resources [1], [5], [6]. Thus, to improve the performance
of existing P2P file sharing systems, and to enable
new classes of P2P applications, a compelling incentive
system needs to be put in place to encourage users to
make their resources available.
Now suppose the existence of an online marketplace
where entities - such as peers, companies, users etc. -
buy and sell surplus resources. In this market place,
a peer might purchase storage and bandwidth from a
dozen other peers for the purpose of remotely backing
up its files; a content publisher might purchase storage
and bandwidth from thousands of peers to create a peer-
driven content distribution network; a biotechnology
company might purchase CPU cycles from thousands
of peers for distributed computation. If such a flourish-
ing resource market existed, individual peers would be
incited to contribute their resources to the marketplace,
thereby unleashing the untapped resource pool.
We envision a free-market resource economy in which
peers buy and sell resources directly from each other [7],
[8]. In this market, selling peers are free to set the prices
of their resources as they please. A client peer, interested
in purchasing a specific resource, is permitted to “shop”
the different server peers and choose the peers that best
satisfy its needs at the best prices. The “money” paid by
the client peers and earned by the server peers may be
real money, or some pseudo-currency similar to frequent
flyer miles. When a seller earns money, it can later spend
the money in the resource market, obtaining resources
from other seller peers.
In a P2P resource economy a client peer can select one
or more server peers for downloading a file or streaming
a stored audio/video object. In general, multiple server
peers may have the object available, with each offering
a different price. A serving peer’s price will naturally
depend on the specific object, the duration of the trans-
mission, and the rate at which the transmission is to
occur. The client may obtain different portions of the
object in parallel from different serving peers, as is
currently already the case with KaZaA and other file
sharing systems. The optimal peer selection problem is
to select, from the subset of the peers that have the
desired object, a set of peers and downloading rates that
minimize cost and/or delay.
More specifically, when a client peer wants to obtain
a specific object, the following steps may be taken:
(1) Discovery: The client first uses a look-up service
to discover server peers that have a copy of the
object. KaZaA is one example of such a lookup
service, but structured DHTs could also be used
for this.
(2) Pricing: The client then queries the server peers
for their prices. Alternatively, price information
might be available via the lookup service.
(3) Reputation: The client may also use a reputation
service to determine the reliability of each of the
server peers. (Reputation services are beyond the
scope of this paper; see [9], [10].)
(4) Server and rate selection: From the subset of
reputable server peers offering the object, the client
peer selects the server peers from which it obtains
the object. The client obtains different segments of
the object from each of the selected server peers.
The servers may offer a segment at different upload
rates, and advertise an upload price as a function of
the upload rate. The client peer will naturally want
to choose the server peers (and rates) to minimize
cost and delay.
(5) Payment: Money is transferred from the client
peer to the server peers. A protocol for transferring
money in a P2P resource market is described in [7],
[8].
In this paper we study the optimal peer selection
problem for two delivery schemes: (i) streaming, where
the portions of the object must arrive in a timely manner
such that the client peer can render the object without
glitches; (ii) downloading, where the client wants to
receive the entire file as quickly and inexpensively as
possible, but does not render the file during the down-
load. For both schemes, there are many variations of
the optimal peer selection problem. For example, for
downloading, one can minimize the download delay
subject to a cost constraint, or minimize the cost subject
to a download delay constraint. We do not attempt to
solve all possible variations in an encyclopedic manner.
Instead, we have formulated a few problems that we
feel are particularly representative and important. The
techniques developed in this paper can be extended to
other natural variations.
For the downloading problem, we formulate and solve
the problem of minimizing the (parallel) downloading
time subject to a budget constraint. We find that the
optimal solution is a greedy one in which costly servers
are fully excluded from downloading. We also determine
the Nash equilibrium for the servers’ prices. For the
streaming problem, we consider the problem of mini-
mizing cost subject to a continuous-playback constraint.
Because server peers often fail (because of intentional or
unintentional disconnects from the P2P system), we also
consider peer failures in our formulation. We are able to
find the optimal solution when any subset of f chosen
peers may fail. We solve the streaming problem for both
convex and concave cost functions.
For both schemes, a content publisher may also be an
active component of the system. For example, CNN.com
may contract with a large number of peers to store
chunks of video files. When another peer, say Alice, asks
CNN to see a video, CNN may select the peers on Alice’s
behalf. The selected peers would then either stream or
upload the object, depending on the delivery scheme. The
methodology developed in this paper is applicable when
the client peer is to select the server peers, or when an
intermediate peer (such as CNN) selects the server peers
on the client’s behalf.
The contribution of our work is the development
of theoretical methodologies for these types of peer
selection problems. To facilitate the analysis, we use a
model of the network where delivery rates can more or
less be guaranteed. As discussed in the next section, this
assumption can be partially justified due to the abun-
dance of bandwidth in the Internet core. Implementation
of peer selection techniques in more accurate networking
models, while not explicitly addressed in this paper, can
more easily be accomplished by using our results as a
guide or starting point.
II. PRICING MODEL
In this section we describe our pricing model. As
mentioned in the introduction, each server is free to set
its own prices. Consider a server peer i. As part of a
delivery session, peer i will transfer a portion of the bytes
of some object o to a client peer. For such a delivery,
the server peer will fix an appropriate price that could
naturally depend on:
• The object itself: For example, recently-released
objects (e.g., videos) might be more expensive than
older objects.
• Rate of transfer: The server may be able to transfer
the object at different rates, and charge different
prices for different rates. In this paper we suppose
that peer i has a maximum transfer rate ui and can
transfer at any rate b in the interval [0, ui].
• Duration of transfer: The longer the transfer
(at some constant rate), the more a server should
charge. We typically expect the server’s price to be
proportional to the duration of the transfer.
For a particular object o, we consider pricing functions
of the form
price = ci(bi) · ti
where bi ∈ [0, ui] is the rate (in bytes per second) of
the transfer from server i and ti is the duration of the
transfer for server i. Thus, for a given transfer rate bi the
price is proportional to the duration of transfer.
It is natural to assume that ci(0) = 0 and ci(·) is non-
decreasing for all i = 1, . . . , I . Furthermore, depending
on the broader context, a cost-rate function ci(·) may
be either convex or concave. For example, if a server
is sharing its upstream bandwidth resources between
the P2P downloading application and other applications,
then the marginal cost to the server of allocating more
bandwidth to the streaming application can be increasing
with bi, in which case ci(·) is convex. On the other
hand, the server may prefer to sell in bulk to individual
clients (because of client acquisition costs), in which
case ci(·) is naturally concave. We therefore analyze both
the convex and concave cases for both the downloading
and streaming problems.
Note that if a server sends at rate bi bytes/sec for a
duration of ti seconds, then the server transfers xi = biti
bytes. This implies that the price can also be defined in
terms of the rate bi and the object size xi since the price
is equal to ci(bi)ti = [ci(bi)/bi]xi. Thus, c(b) is the cost
per unit time for data streamed at rate b, and c(b)/b is
the cost per byte for data streamed at rate b.
Before proceeding, let us examine more carefully what
it means for a server to be able to transfer bytes at a
specific rate b. A server i will have access to the Internet
with some upstream rate ui. At any given time, the server
peer i could be transferring files to multiple peers, with
each file transfer taking place at its negotiated rate. In
order to meet its commitment, server i, of course, must
ensure that the sum of all the committed transfer rates
does not exceed its upstream access rate ui. In today’s
Internet (and in the foreseeable future), the bottleneck
is typically in the access and not in the Internet core.
Furthermore, in most broadband residential connections
today (including cable modem and ADSL), the upstream
rate is significantly less than the downstream rate. Thus,
in many cases the bandwidth bottleneck between server
and client is the server’s upload rate. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that a server can provide an offered
rate b as long as the sum of server’s committed ongoing
rates is less than ui. Even when this assumption is
unreasonable, the formulations and results of this paper
provide a framework and starting point for studying
scenarios without the assumption.
There will be situations, however, when the server
will not be able to honor its commitment due to unusual
congestion or service failures in the core. In this case,
the client peer may want some form of a refund. Fur-
thermore, either the server or the client may be dishonest
and may not agree on whether the service was actually
rendered. Thus, some form of arbitration - preferably
lightweight - may be needed in a realistic P2P resource
market; see, e.g., [7]. In Section IV, we will describe a
client strategy that allows one or more of the contracted
peers to fail, either because of technical problems or
dishonesty.
III. OPTIMAL PEER SELECTION FOR DOWNLOADING
As discussed in the Introduction, in this paper we
explore the optimal peer selection problem for two
delivery schemes, streaming and downloading. In this
section we consider the downloading problem, in which
case the client wants to receive the entire file as quickly
and inexpensively as possible, but does not render the
file while downloading.
Naturally, a client desiring a specific object o would
like to obtain the object as quickly as possible and at
lowest possible cost. These two objectives will often be
conflicting, as servers that provide high transfer rates
may also demand high per-byte transfer costs. There
are many ways to formulate an optimization problem
that takes into account these conflicting goals. In this
section, we consider one natural formulation: the client
selects the peers and rates in order to minimize the total
download time subject to a budget constraint for the
download. (Although not considered here, the problem
of minimizing the cost subject to a constraint on the
download time is also tractable.)
We can now define the optimal downloading problem.
Consider a client peer that wants to download a file o.
Let F be the size (in bytes) of the file. As described in
the introduction, the client peer uses a location service
to find the set of peers, denoted in the following as
{1, · · · , I}, that have a copy of the file. Each server peer
i in this set advertises a price function ci(bi), bi ∈ [0, ui].
We assume that the client peer has a budget K for this
particular download, that is, the client peer is prepared
to spend up to K units on the download.
Let ti be the transfer time for server i in this down-
load, i.e., the amount of time that i participates in the
download. If the client peer does not select server peer
i, then ti = 0. The number of bytes transferred by server
peer i is biti. Because the client wants to obtain the entire
file, we have b1t1 + · · · + bItI = F . Our optimal peer
selection problem is to determine bi, i = 1, . . . , I , and
ti, i = 1, . . . , I , that minimize the total download time
subject to the budget constraint. Because the client is
downloading from multiple server peers in parallel, the
total download time is the maximum of the ti. Thus, the
optimization problem is
minmax{t1, . . . , tI} (1)
subject to
c1(b1)t1 + · · ·+ cI(bI)tI ≤ K (2)
b1t1 + · · ·+ bItI ≥ F (3)
0 ≤ bi ≤ ui i = 1, . . . , I (4)
ti ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , I (5)
Note that since the the cost functions ci(b) are non-
decreasing, any optimal solution must make the con-
straint in (3) binding. (For otherwise, we can decrease
bi and/or ti for some i, while maintaining feasibility and
not increasing the objective value.)
Also note that without the budget constraint (2), the
optimal solution is given by bi = ui, ti = F/(u1+ · · ·+
uI), i = 1, . . . , I , and the resulting minimal download
time is F/(u1 + · · · + uI). In other words, without
the budget constraint, in the optimal solution, the client
downloads from all of the servers at their maximum rates
until all client as received all the bytes in the file. Thus
F/(u1 + · · ·+ uI) is a lower bound for the value of the
optimization problem (1).
A. Concave Pricing Functions
As discussed in Section II, depending on the broader
context, a cost function ci(·) may be either convex or
concave. We first consider the scenario when ci(b), b ∈
[0, ui] is concave, for all i = 1, . . . , I . As it will become
evident below, this scenario also provides the solution
for the case when each server is capable of transmitting
at only the rate ui at cost ci = ci(ui)/ui per byte.
Lemma 1: Suppose for all i = 1, . . . , I , ci(b) is concave
for b ∈ [0, ui]. Then, there exists an optimal solution such
that for each i = 1, . . . , I: bi = 0 if ti = 0, and bi = ui
if ti > 0.
Proof: If ti = 0 for some i, then letting bi = 0 will not
affect either the constraints or the objective value.
To argue the case of ti > 0 implying bi = ui, we first
note that the concavity of ci(b), along with ci(0) = 0,
implies that ci(b)/b is non-increasing in b. Hence, start
with any optimal solution (bi, ti)Ii=0, if tj > 0 and bj <
uj for some j, we can then modify the solution to
b′j = uj , t
′
j = bjtj/uj ≤ tj .
This way, b′jt′j = bjtj , hence, the constraint in (3)
remains intact, while the constraint in (2) continues to
hold since
cj(b′j)t
′
j ≤ cj(bj)tj ,
which is equivalent to
cj(b′j)/b
′
j ≤ cj(bj)/bj ,
i.e., the non-increasing property of cj(b)/b mentioned
above. Furthermore, since t′j ≤ tj , the objective value
will not increase. ♣
The above lemma implies that the optimal decision on
the rates, bi’s, follows directly from the optimal ti’s, and
hence can be eliminated from the problem formulation.
Specifically, letting ci := ci(ui)/ui, the original prob-
lem can be reduced to the following equivalent linear
program (LP):
min y (6)
s.t.
∑
i
cixi ≤ K, (7)∑
i
xi ≥ F, (8)
0 ≤ xi ≤ uiy, ∀i. (9)
To see, the equivalence, suppose (b∗i , t∗i ), i = 1, . . . , I , is
an optimal solution to the original problem. Then, letting
y∗ = max
i
{t∗i }; x∗i = b∗i t∗i , i = 1, . . . , I
results in a feasible solution to the LP, taking into
account b∗i = 0 or ui for all i. Conversely, if
(y∗, x∗1, . . . , x∗I) is the optimal LP solution, then a feasi-
ble solution to the original problem is obtained by letting
for each i, bi = ti = 0 if xi = 0, and bi = ui and
ti = xi/ui if xi > 0.
Therefore, it suffices to solve the LP problem. To this
end, re-order the server peers such that
0 < c1 < · · · < cI . (10)
Also, denote
Bj :=
j∑
i=1
ui, βj :=
j∑
i=1
uici. (11)
It is easy to verify that βj/Bj is increasing in j, since
βj
Bj
≤ βj+1
Bj+1
iff βj ≤ Bjcj+1,
and the last inequality follows from (10). We note that
if β1/B1 > K/F , that is, K < Fc1, then there is
no feasible solution to the LP. Henceforth, we assume
β1/B1 ≤ K/F .
Theorem 1: Suppose for all i = 1, . . . , I , ci(b) is
concave for b ∈ [0, ui]. Then the solution to the LP,
and hence the original downloading problem, takes the
following form: (a) If K/F ≥ βI/BI , then xi = uiy for
all i, where y = F/BI . (b) Otherwise, suppose for some
j ≤ I we have
βj
Bj
>
K
F
≥ βj−1
Bj−1
.
Then,
xi = uiy, i ≤ j − 1; xj = F − yBj−1;
xj+1 = · · · = xn = 0;
where
y =
Fcj −K
cjBj − βj .
In both cases, y is the optimal objective value.
Proof: If βI/BI ≤ K/F , then it is easily seen that xi =
uiy for all i, where y = F/BI , is a feasible solution to
the LP, with a download time equal to the lower bound
F/BI . Thus, this solution is clearly optimal.
Next, consider the case of βI/BI < K/F . The dual
of the above LP is as follows, with the dual variables v
and w corresponding, respectively, to the constraints in
(7) and (8), and zi corresponding to xi ≤ uiy in (9):
minFw −Kv (12)
s.t. w − zi − civ ≤ 0, (13)∑
i
uizi ≤ 1, (14)
v ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0, ∀i.
Below, we start deriving a dual feasible solution, which
then leads to a primal feasible solution via complemen-
tary slackness. Once these are verified — dual and primal
feasibility and complementary slackness — the problem
is completely solved.
Letting the constraints in (13) and (14) be binding, we
get:
zi = w − civ, (15)
w =
1 + vβI
BI
. (16)
Then, the dual objective becomes
Fw −Kv = F
BI
+
(FβI
B
−K
)
v.
Consider, for the time being, βIBI >
K
F ≥ βI−1BI−1 . Then
v = vI := 1/(cIB − β). Note cIBI > βI follows from
(10); and for all i,
zi =
1
BI
+
( βI
BI
− ci
)
vI ≥ 0
follows from
vI ≤ 1
ciBI − βI , ∀i : ciB > βI ,
since cn ≥ ci. Also note that zn = 0.
The dual feasible solution results in a dual objective
value as follows:
F
BI
+
(FβI
BI
−K
)
· 1
cIBI − βI =
FcI −K
cIBI − βI . (17)
For the corresponding primal solution, consider the fol-
lowing:
xi = uiy, ∀i 6= I; xI = F − yBI−1; (18)
where y is the primal objective value, obtained via
substituting the above solution into (7) and making the
latter an equality:
yβI−1 + cI
(
F − yBI−1
)
= K,
from which we can obtain
y =
FcI −K
cIBI−1 − βI−1 =
FcI −K
cIBI − βI , (19)
i.e., the primal objective value is equal to the dual
objective value in (17).
We still need to verify primal feasibility and comple-
mentary slackness. First note that y ≥ 0 follows from
(17): both terms on its LHS are positive. Then xn ≥ 0
is equivalent to
F
BI−1
≥ F
BI
+
(FβI
BI
−K
)
vI ,
which simplifies (with some algebra) to KF ≥ βI−1BI−1 , the
assumed condition in Case (ii). Other aspects of primal
feasibility hold trivially. Complementary slackness is
readily verified: all primal variables are positive, and all
dual constraints are binding; all dual variables except zI
are positive, and all primal constraints except xI ≤ uIy,
the I-th constraint in (9), are binding.
Next suppose K/F falls into the following range:
βI−1
BI−1
>
K
F
≥ βI−2
BI−2
.
Then, the dual solution is:
v = vI−1 :=
1
(cI−1BI−1 − βI−1) , w =
1 + vI−1βI−1
BI−1
,
and
zi = w − civ, i ≤ I − 1; zI = 0.
The primal solution is:
x = uiy, i ≤ I − 2; xI−1 = F − yBI−2, xI = 0;
and
y =
FcI−1 −K
cI−1BI−2 − βI−2 =
FcI−1 −K
cI−1BI−1 − βI−1 .
Feasibility (primal and dual) and complementary slack-
ness can be verified as before. ♣
Roughly speaking, Theorem 1 indicates that the client
downloads in parallel from the least expensive servers
at their maximum rates. The number of parallel servers
is determined from the budget constraint. To meet the
budget constraint with equality, one of the selected
servers transmits for less time than the other parallel
servers. Again, this result is true for two important
special cases: (i) when the the cost per byte is linear
in b for all servers; and (ii) when each selected server
can transmit only at one rate.
B. Convex Pricing Functions
We now consider the downloading problem for convex
pricing functions. Specifically, in this section we suppose
that ci(b) is convex with respect to b for all i = 1, . . . , I .
We’ll see that this scenario gives rise to a completely
different form for the optimal solution. In particular,
for many natural pricing functions, all I servers will be
selected with none of servers transmitting at its maximal
rate. Let t∗ denote the minimal download time for the
downloading problem.
Theorem 2: Suppose ci(b) is convex in b for all i =
1, . . . , I . Then, there exists an optimal solution for the
downloading problem with ti = t∗ for all i.
Proof: First note that the convexity of ci(b) implies that
ci(b)/b is non-decreasing in b. Suppose ti < t∗ for some
i. Then, we can increase ti to t∗ while decreasing bi
to b′i = biti/t∗. This way, there is no increase in the
objective value; the constraint in (3) remains intact; and
the constraint in (2) still holds, since
ci(bi)ti ≥ ci(b′i)t∗,
i.e.,
ci(bi)/bi ≥ ci(b′i)/b′i,
which follows from the non-decreasing property of
ci(b)/b mentioned above, as b′i ≤ bi. ♣
We remark that Theorem 2 does not necessarily imply
that all peers are selected when the cost functions are
convex. Indeed, for an optimal solution with ti = t∗ for
all i, we may have bj = 0 for one or more server peers
j. The peers with bj = 0 are not selected.
Theorem 2 leads to a recipe for identifying the optimal
solution. To this end, again let t∗ denote the optimal
download time and let bi, i = 1, . . . , I , be the corre-
sponding optimal rates. By Theorem 2 and (2)-(5) we
know that these rates must satisfy
c1(b1)t∗ + · · ·+ cI(bI)t∗ ≤ K (20)
b1 + · · ·+ bI = F/t∗ (21)
0 ≤ bi ≤ ui i = 1, . . . , I (22)
Thus, to find the optimal solution we can search over all
values of t ≥ F/(u1+ · · ·+ uI); for each value of t we
solve the optimization problem:
minimize
c1(b1)t+ · · ·+ cI(bI)t (23)
subject to
b1 + · · ·+ bI = F/t (24)
0 ≤ bi ≤ ui i = 1, . . . , I (25)
The optimal t∗ is found by finding the smallest t
such that the objective value for (23)-(25) is no greater
than K. The optimization problem is a marginal analysis
problem; it can be efficiently solved with the techniques
in Section IV. Moreover, since the cost functions are
convex, the value of the optimization problem (23)-(25)
is convex in t (see Section IV). Thus, the optimal t can
be found with a binary search.
We remark in passing that another interesting aspect
to consider is a restriction on the maximum download
rate d to the client. In this case we would have the
additional constraint b1+ · · ·+ bI ≤ d at all times. With
asymmetric access (as in ADSL and most cable modem
access systems), the downstream bandwidth is typically
larger than the upstream bandwidth. However, a client
peer downloading from multiple server peers would
eventually saturate the client’s downstream bandwidth
d. We note that if each server peer can transmit only at
one rate ui then the problem of selecting an optimal set
of peers and rates for downloading a file under a client
bandwidth restriction can be easily shown to be NP-
Complete, by a reduction from the Knapsack problem
[11]. The problem of selecting a set of servers with
aggregate bandwidth as close as possible, but not larger
than, the client bandwidth is basically just the Knapsack
problem.
From the discussions in the last two subsections, in
particular the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, it is
clear that the required concavity or convexity of the cost
functions ci(b) can be relaxed to the weaker condition
of ci(b)/b being non-increasing or non-decreasing, re-
spectively. Note that a function f(x) with x ≥ 0 and
f(0) = 0 is termed “star-shaped” if f(x)/x is non-
decreasing. This is a standard property in reliability
theory, refer to [12]. It is well-known (and easy to verify)
that a convex function is star-shaped, but a star-shaped
function need not be either convex or concave.
C. Nash Equilibrium
Suppose a client is interested in downloading the file o
of size F , and it makes its budget K known to the server
peers. Suppose now that each peer server i is free to set
its pricing function ci(b), 0 ≤ b ≤ ui. We now turn
our attention to the problem of what pricing function
a server should propose to this client. To simplify the
analysis, suppose each server can transmit at either rate
0 or ui. Let ci := ci(ui)/ui. We refer to c = (c1, . . . , cI),
consisting of all the proposed prices, as the pricing
vector.
For a given pricing vector c, the peer client will
determine the optimal number of bytes to allocate to
each server. Let (x1(c), . . . , xI(c)) denote the optimal
allocation for pricing vector c = (c1, . . . , cI). For a given
c, server i earns revenue Ri(c) = cixi(c). Assuming
that the servers are rational, a server i would modify its
cost ci if it could increase its revenue Ri(c). A pricing
(c∗1, c∗2, . . . , c∗I) is said to be a Nash equilibrium if
Ri(c∗1, . . . , c
∗
i + δ, . . . , c
∗
I) ≤ Ri(c∗1, . . . , c∗i , . . . , c∗I)
for all δ and all i = 1, . . . , I . In other words,
(c∗1, c∗2, . . . , c∗I) is a Nash equilibrium if no server can
improve its revenue by unilaterally changing its price.
To analyze the Nash equilibrium, we remark that when
cˆi = K/F for all i = 1, . . . , I , then xˆi = uiF/(u1 +
· · · + uI), i = 1, . . . , I , is optimal for the downloading
problem. To see this, note that (xˆ1, . . . , xˆI) is feasible
for the pricing vector cˆ = (cˆ1, . . . , cˆI) and gives the
minimal cost F/(u1 + · · · + uI). We can now state the
following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: cˆi = K/F for all i = 1, . . . , I is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: We first observe that when cˆi = K/F for all
i = 1, . . . , I , then xˆi = uiF/(u1+· · ·+uI), i = 1, . . . , I
is optimal for (6). To see this, note that (xˆ1, . . . , xˆI) is
feasible for the pricing vector cˆ = (cˆ1, . . . , cˆI) and gives
the minimal cost F/(u1 + · · ·+ uI).
Now let c˜ be a pricing vector that is identical to cˆ
for all components except component j, for which c˜j =
cˆj + δ. It suffices to show that for δ 6= 0,
Rj(c˜) < Rj(cˆ). (26)
First consider the case δ < 0. For the pricing vector c˜,
the allocation (xˆ1, . . . , xˆI) is optimal since it is feasible
and it gives the minimal cost F/(u1 + · · · + uI). Thus
Rj(c˜) = (cˆj + δ)xˆj < cˆj xˆj = Rj(cˆ), establishing (26).
Now suppose δ > 0, so that c˜j > c˜i for all i 6= j. Reorder
the indices so that j = I . With the pricing vector c˜, we
have β/B > K/F = βI−1/BI . Thus, from Theorem 1,
x˜I = F − yBI−1 where y = (F cˆI −K)/(cˆIBI −βI). It
is straightforward to show that cIBI − βI = δBI−1 and
FCI −K = δF . Thus, y = F/BI−1 and x˜I = 0. Thus
RI(c˜) = (cˆI + δ)x˜I = 0 < RI(cˆ), again establishing
(26). ♣
The Nash equilibrium in Corollary 1 has several
notable proprerties:
1) The price cˆi does not depend on ui, the upload
rate of server i.
2) All peers have the same price in the Nash equilib-
rium.
3) For each peer, the Nash price is exactly equal to
the price per byte that the client is willing to pay,
namely, K/F .
IV. OPTIMAL SELECTION FOR STREAMING
In this section, we consider streaming of encoded
(compressed) audio or video. The delivery constraints are
more stringent than for downloading: in order to prevent
glitches in playback, the servers must continuously de-
liver segments of the object on or before their scheduled
playout times.
An important parameter for the streaming delivery is
the object’s playback rate, denoted by r. For an object
of size F with playback rate r, the viewing time is
T = F/r seconds. Suppose the user at the client begins
to view the video at time 0. A fundamental constraint
in the streaming problem is that for all times t with
0 ≤ t ≤ T , the client must receive the first r · t bytes of
the object. We refer to this constraint as the “continuous-
playback” constraint. Thus, when selecting the server
peers and the object portions to be obtained from each
server peer, the client must ensure that this continuous-
playback constraint is satisfied. A natural optimization
problem is, therefore, to select the peers in order to
minimize the total streaming cost subject to continuous
playback. To simplify the analysis and to see the forest
through the trees, throughout we assume that there is no
initial client buffering before rendering, that is, the client
begins playback as soon as it begins to receive bytes
from any server. Note that for streaming, it is highly
desirable that the playback can continue even if some of
the server peers fail to provide their services. (In contrast,
for downloading a server failure will merely result in a
delay in the total download time.) Thus, it is important to
explicitly account for failure in the optimal peer selection
problem.
As in the previous section, denote {1, . . . , I} for the
set of server peers that have a copy of the desired object,
and denote. ci(b) for the cost per unit time when peer i
transfers at rate b. To simplify the discussion, we remove
the restriction bi ≤ ui; thus, we allow bi to take any value
in [0, r] for all i = 1, . . . , I .
Note that in general, the client must not only select
a subset of peer servers, but it must also determine
and schedule the specific portions of the file that are
downloaded from each selected peer, as well as the
download rate from each selected peer. There are two
broad approaches that can be taken to solve this problem:
time segmentation and rate segmentation. In time
segmentation, the video is partitioned along the time
axis in distinct segments, and each server is responsible
for streaming only one of the segments in the partition.
Typically in the optimal solution for time segmentation,
the client will begin downloading segments from vari-
ous servers before the scheduled playout times of the
first bytes of those segments. Thus, client buffering is
required. Furthermore, in the optimal solution, the client
will typically receive segments from all the selected
servers at the beginning of the video and from only
one of the selected servers at the end of the video. This
means that the client must be able to download (at the
beginning of the video) at a rate that is equal to the
sum of the server download rates, which will exceed the
playback rate. In the rate segmentation approach, each
of the selected servers contributes bytes for each of the
frames in the video, and at any instant of time the client
downloads at the playback rate. In this paper we focus
on rate segmentation.
To justify focusing on rate segmentation, we now
demonstrate that for convex cost functions, time seg-
mentation is at least as expensive as rate segmentation in
terms of download cost. Since time segmentation has the
additional drawbacks of requiring both client buffering
and higher client download rates, rate segmentation for
such cost functions will usually be the better strategy.
Theorem 3: Suppose ci(b) is convex with respect to
b for all i = 1, . . . , I . Then for any solution S that
uses time segmentation, there is a solution S ′ using rate
segmentation that has no larger cost.
Proof: Recall that F is the size (in bytes) of the object
being streamed, r is the rate of playback, and T = F/r
is the rendering time of the object. The convexity of the
cost functions implies that for any rate b and any λ ≥ 1,
ci(λb) ≥ λci(b). In solution S, let xi be the number
of bytes of the object sent by server i and let ti be the
length of time during which server i sends these bytes.
Since ti ≤ T for all i,
time segmentation cost =
I∑
i=1
ci(bi)ti
=
I∑
i=1
ci(
xi
T
T
ti
)ti
≥
I∑
i=1
T
ti
ci(
xi
T
)ti
=
I∑
i=1
ci(
xi
T
) · T. (27)
In solution S ′, server i still sends xi bytes, but these are
sent at a rate of bi = xirF =
xi
T over the entire T seconds.
Since
∑
i xi = F , we see that
∑
i bi = r and thus the
rate constraint is satisfied in solution S ′. Furthermore,
rate segmentation cost =
I∑
i=1
ci(bi)ti
=
I∑
i=1
ci(
xi
T
) · T. (28)
Comparing (27) and (28), we see that the cost of S is
as least as great as that of S ′. ♣
A. Problem Formulation
In the rate-segmentation streaming problem, to ensure
continuous playback the client must receive (at least) at
rate r at all times. Thus the objective of the streaming
problem is to choose the server rates b1, . . . , bI which
minimize the total cost c1(b1)T + · · ·+ cI(bI)T subject
to the constraint that the total received rate is at least r.
Because the servers in a P2P system are inherently
unreliable, we must ensure that the client continues to
receive at rate r even when one or more of the selected
servers fails. In the ensuing analysis, we allow for up
to one server failure (in the next subsection we extend
the analysis to multiple server failures). If server j fails
during some period of the streaming, then the client
receives at rate
∑
i6=j bi. Thus, to ensure that the client
continues to receive the video at rate r even when there
is one failure, the rates b1, . . . , bI must satisfy∑
i 6=j
bi ≥ r, j = 1, . . . , I.
We therefore arrive at the following optimization prob-
lem:
min c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) (29)
s.t.
∑
i 6=j
bi ≥ r, j = 1, . . . , I.
0 ≤ bi ≤ r i = 1, . . . , I.
Without loss of generality we have included the con-
straints bi ≤ r for all i = 1, ..., I . Indeed, if an optimal
solution has bj > r for some j, we can always reduce
bj to r without violating feasibility and without having
to increase the objective value (since cj(·) is a non-
decreasing function).
Before proceeding to solve this streaming problem,
we briefly say a few words about implementation. The
optimal solution to (29) typically has b1 + · · · + bK >
r, that is, the aggregate streaming rate (before failure)
exceeds the encoded video rate r. In practice, the video
would be erasure encoded in a manner that server i sends
xi = biT bytes and that client can reconstruct the video
if any I − 1 of the I streams are received. Although
beyond the scope of this paper, it is indeed possible to
devise such erasure encoding schemes.
The above problem can be solved by first solving the
following problem: for any given y: 0 ≤ y ≤ r,
min c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) (30)
s.t.
∑
i
bi ≥ r + y,
0 ≤ bi ≤ y, i = 1, . . . , I.
Denote C(y) as the corresponding optimal value. Then,
solve the problem miny≤r C(y).
To show that the two problems are equivalent, let Φ
be the set of feasible solutions for (29) and, Φ(y) be the
set of feasible solutions for (30). It is easily seen that if
(b1, . . . , bI) belongs to Φ(y) for some 0 ≤ y ≤ r, then
(b1, . . . , bI) also belongs to Φ. Furthermore, it is seen
that if (b1, . . . , bI) belongs to Φ then it also belongs to
Φ(y), where y = maxi{bi} ≤ r. Thus,
Φ =
⋃
y≤r
Φ(y)
and hence minimizing c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) over Φ can
be solved by minimizing c1(b1)+ · · ·+ cI(bI) over each
Φ(y) and then taking the minimimum over all 0 ≤ y ≤ r.
B. Convex Costs
Suppose ci(.) is a convex function, for all i = 1, . . . , I .
For a given y, the subproblem (30) can be solved in
a variety of different ways. For example, if the cost
functions are also differentiable, then (30) can be solved
by solving c′i(b∗i ) = α for i = 1, . . . , I , and then
searching through α so that b∗1 + · · · + b∗I = r + y. We
now provide a marginal allocation algorithm, which does
not require differentiability:
Marginal Allocation:
• Start with S := {1, ..., I} and bi = 0 for all i ∈ S.
• In each step identify
i∗ = argmin
i∈S
{ci(bi +∆)− ci(bi)},
where ∆ > 0 is a pre-specified small increment
(depending on required precision), and reset bi∗ ←
bi∗ +∆. Whenever bi > y−∆, reset S ← S −{i}.
• Continue until the constraint
∑
j bj ≥ r + y is
satisfied.
Note that the complexity of this algorithm is propor-
tional to n(r+y)/∆. To determine the best y, we can do
a line search on C ′(y) = 0, for y ∈ [ rI−1 , r]. (If y < rI−1 ,
then (30) is infeasible.)
If C(y) is convex in y, then miny C(y) is itself
greedily solvable: We can start with y = rn−1 , increase
y by a small increment each time, solve the problem in
(30), and stop when C(y) ceases to decrease or y = r
is reached.
In this algorithm, when we go from one y value to
the next, say, y + δ, we do not have to do the marginal
allocation that generates C(y+δ) from scratch (i.e., start-
ing from all xj values being zero and S := {1, ..., I}).
We can start from where the previous round of marginal
allocation — the one that generates C(y) — first hits
a boundary, i.e., bj = y for some j, and continue from
there. Or, if no bj has hit the boundary in the previous
round, then simply start from where the previous round
ends (i.e., continue with the solution generated by the
previous round). [Recall, y ∈ [ rI−1 , r]. As y increases,
the number of bj values that can hit the boundary in
the marginal allocation will decrease. Specifically, when
y ∈ [ rk−1 , rk−2 ], for k = 3, ..., I , the number of bj values
that can hit the boundary cannot exceed k, since we have
ky ≥ r + y.]
The convexity of C(y), in turn, is guaranteed if the
ci(·) are convex functions. To see this, let (bi(y))Ii=1
denote the optimal solution to the problem in (30), and
consider two such problems, corresponding to y = y1
and y = y2, respectively. For any α ∈ (0, 1), we have
αC(y1) + (1− α)C(y2)
= α
∑
j
cj(bj(y1)) + (1− α)
∑
j
cj(bj(y2))
≥
∑
j
cj(αbj(y1) + (1− α)bj(y2)),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of the
cj . Next, consider a third version of (30), with y =
αy1 + (1− α)y2.
It is straightforward to verify that αbj(y1)+(1−α)bj(y2),
j = 1, ..., I , is a feasible solution to this problem.
Therefore, we have
∑
j
cj(αbj(y1) + (1− α)bj(y2)) ≥ C(y),
and hence
αC(y1) + (1− α)C(y2) ≥ C(y) = C(αy1 + (1− α)y2).
That is, C(y) is a convex function. To summarize, we
have:
Theorem 4: Suppose for each i = 1, ..., I , ci(·) is a
convex function. Then, the optimal value in (30), C(y),
is convex in y. In this case, the streaming problem in (29)
is greedily solvable: In each step increase y by a small
increment (starting from y = rI−1 ), apply the marginal
allocation algorithm to generate C(y), and stop when
C(y) ceases to decrease or y = r is reached.
C. Concave Costs
Now, suppose the costs ci(·), i = 1, . . . , I , are concave
(instead of convex) functions. The equivalence of (29)
and (30) continues to hold. However, there are two
changes:
(i) The marginal allocation will not generate the opti-
mal solution to (30).
(ii) C(y) is no longer a convex function. (Neither is it
a concave function, for that matter.)
The reason for (ii) is evident from examining the
earlier argument that established the convexity of C(y).
The reason for (i) is that the marginal allocation typically
generates a solution that is at the interior of the feasible
region of the problem in (30), which is a polytope. As
such the solution can be expressed as a convex com-
bination of the extreme points (vertices) of the feasible
region. (This follows from the well-known Carathe´odory
Theorem.) Due to the concavity, the objective value
corresponding to this solution will dominate (i.e., be no
smaller than) the convex combination of the objective
values corresponding to the extreme points, and hence
dominate the smallest of these values.
Therefore, to solve the optimization problem in (30)
in this case, we only need to consider the extreme points
of its feasible region.
First, observe that the constraint
∑
j bj ≥ r+y must be
binding at optimality; otherwise, we could always reduce
some of the bj values and thereby improve the objective
value while maintaining feasibility.
Second, we divide the range y ∈ [ rI−1 , r] into seg-
ments [ rk−1 ,
r
k−2 ], for k = 3, ..., I . Then, with the
constraint
∑
j bj ≥ r + y binding, it is clear that the
number of bj values at the boundary, bj = y, cannot
exceed k when y ∈ [ rk−1 , rk−2 ]. (Here we assume I ≥ 3;
the case of I = 2 is trivial: the optimal solution is
b1 = b2 = y = r.)
Consequently, when y ∈ [ rk−1 , rk−2 ], we only need to
consider extreme points that take the following form:
bj = y for k− 1 distinct indices j, b` = r− (k− 2)y for
another distinct index `, and bi = 0 for all the remaining
i’s. For each such extreme point, the bi’s sum up to
(k − 1)y + r − (k − 2)y = r + y,
making the constraint
∑
j bj ≥ r + y binding.
Specifically, with y a given value in the interval
[ rk−1 ,
r
k−2 ], without loss of generality, suppose
c1(y) ≤ c2(y) ≤ · · · ≤ cI(y), (31)
ci1(r − (k − 2)y) ≤ · · · ≤ ciI (r − (k − 2)y), (32)
where (i1, . . . , iI) is a permutation of (1, . . . , I). Denote
αi := ci(y), βi := ci(r − (k − 2)y).
Clearly, we only need to consider no more than k
such extreme points, which we shall refer to as non-
dominant. Each of the other extreme points is dominant,
in the sense that it’s objective value C(y) will dominate
(i.e., be at least as large as) one of the non-dominant
points.
Let α−i denote the vector (α1, α2, . . . , αk) without the
component αi for some i = 1, ..., k. Then, specifically,
these (possibly) non-dominant points are
(α−1;β1), (α−2;β2), . . . , (α−k, βk) (33)
(α−k;βk+1), (α−2;βk+2), . . . , (α−k, βI). (34)
As before, let C(y) denote the optimal objective value of
(30). Then the C(y) value corresponding to an extreme
point is the sum of k− 1 values of αi (for k− 1 distinct
i’s) and one value of βj for a j that is distinct from all
the i’s.
Theorem 5: Suppose that for all i = 1, ..., I , ci(·) is a
concave function. Then, the optimal solution to (30), for
y ∈ [ rk−1 , rk−2 ], k = 3, ..., I , is generated by taking the
minimum of the objective values, C(y), corresponding
to the I points in (33) and (34). The solution to the
streaming problem in (29) is then obtained by applying
a line search to miny∈[r/(I−1),r]C(y).
We may be able to further eliminate some of the
non-dominant points. Let us illustrate this through an
example. Consider n = 5. Suppose the permutation in
(31) is (i1, . . . , i5) = (2, 4, 1, 3, 5). Consider k = 4.
Then, the following four points correspond to the ones
in (33):
(1, 3, 4; 2), (1, 2, 3; 4), (2, 3, 4; 1), (1, 2, 4; 3). (35)
A closer examination tells us, however, that the last
two of the four points in (35) are, in fact, dominant:
they dominate, respectively, (1, 3, 4; 2) and (1, 2, 3; 4).
Hence, in this case, there are only 2 non-dominant
points. Specifically, any point that involves a βi` such
that i` violates the increasing order in the permutation
(i1, i2, . . . , in) cannot be a dominant point. This is the
case for 1 and 3 in the permutation (2, 4, 1, 3, 5) in the
above example.
The full details of this example can be worked out as
follows:
• y ∈ [ r4 , r3), k = 5: the non-dominant points are:
(1, 3, 4, 5; 2), (1, 2, 3, 5; 4), (1, 2, 3, 4; 5).
• y ∈ [ r3 , r2), k = 4: the non-dominant points are:
(1, 3, 4; 2), (1, 2, 3; 4).
• y ∈ [ r2 , r], k = 3: the non-dominant points are:
(1, 3; 2), (1, 2; 4).
In each case, the optimal solution (to (30)) is obtained by
comparing the C(y) values of the non-dominant points
and picking the one corresponding to the smallest C(y)
value.
Finally, a comment on the line search mentioned in
the above proposition. Suppose we divide the interval
[ rI−1 , r] into equal segments, each of length ∆. Let N :=
r(I−2)
(I−1)∆ denote the number of such segments. When ∆ is
sufficiently small, we can safely assume that the ordering
in (31) does not change over any given segment. This
means that for any y that belongs to a given segment,
the optimal value C(y) is determined by a single non-
dominant point (α−i` ;βi`). That is,
C(y) =
∑
i≤k,i 6=i`
ci(y) + ci`(r − (k − 2)y).
Hence, C(y) is a concave function over this segment,
since the ci and ci` are all concave functions. Conse-
quently, the minimum of C(y) can only be attained at
the two end points of the segment. Therefore, the line
search to minimize C(y) amounts to evaluating N values
of C(y) and picking the smallest one. This way, the
streaming problem is solved by an algorithm of O(NI)
time.
Example: We now completely work out the optimal
bandwidth profile for the problem in (29) in the case of
concave cost functions. Let r = 5 and
c1(b) =
√
b
c2(b) = 0.5b
3
4
c3(b) = 0.7b
3
5
c4(b) = 0.5b
r = 5
(a) Concave ci(b) functions (b) Objective function C(y)
Fig. 1. (a) shows the various concave cost functions for 0 ≤ b ≤ 5. (b) is the corresponding plot for the objective function C(y) for
5/3 ≤ y ≤ 5.
In Figure 1(a) we plot the four concave cost functions
ci(b) for 0 ≤ b ≤ r.
Let C(y) be defined as in (30). Then the minimal cost
(29) is given by
Copt = min
y∈[ r
I−1 ,r]
C(y).
We use the solution procedure described in Section IV-C
to evaluate C(y) for y ∈ [ rI−1 , r]. This result is plotted
in Figure 1(b). As can be seen from Figure 1(b), C(y)
is neither a concave nor a convex function, implying
that a line search has to be done for finding Copt. It
can also be seen that Copt is achieved at y = 2.5.
The corresponding optimal bandwidth profile is given by
b1 = 0, b2 = 2.5, b3 = 2.5, b4 = 2.5. The corresponding
cost of downloading is Copt = C(2.5) = 3.4557.
D. Multiple Unavailable Servers
The above approach extends readily to the general case
when multiple servers can become unavailable. Let f be
the maximum number of servers that can be unavailable,
where 1 ≤ f ≤ I − 1. In this case, the problem
formulation in (29) becomes,
min c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) (36)
s.t.
∑
j 6=i1,...,if
bj ≥ r, i1, . . . , if = 1, . . . , I.
0 ≤ bi ≤ r, i = 1, . . . , I.
In the above optimization problem, the notation
i1, . . . , if = 1, . . . , I means one such constraint for every
subset of f elements from {1, . . . , I}.
We claim that the equivalent problem, for 0 ≤ y ≤ r,
becomes
min c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) (37)
s.t.
∑
j
bj ≥ r + fy,
0 ≤ bi ≤ y ≤ r, i = 1, . . . , I.
The key observation here is that the optimal solution
to (36) must satisfy the property that the largest f values
of bi are all equal. Specifically, without loss of generality,
suppose
b1 ≥ b2 · · · ≥ bf ≥ bf+1 ≥ · · · ≥ bI (38)
is an optimal solution to (36). Then, we must have b1 =
b2 = · · · = bf . Consider any e < f , and hence be ≥ bf .
We can reduce be to bf and still do no worse on the
objective value (as the ci’s are non-decreasing functions),
while maintaining feasibility. To see this, consider the
constraint
be + bf+2 + · · ·+ bI ≥ r. (39)
Reducing be to bf turns the above into
bf + bf+2 + · · ·+ bI ≥ r, (40)
which certainly holds as it is one of the constraints
involving bf . Furthermore, any other constraint that
involves be has a left hand side that is at least as large as
the left hand side of (39) – due to the ordering in (38).
Hence, it will also remain feasible when be is reduced
to bf , since its left hand side, after the reduction, will
still dominate the left hand side of (40).
Therefore, we can solve the following equivalent prob-
lem:
min c1(b1) + · · ·+ cI(bI) (41)
s.t.
∑
j
bj ≥ r + fy,
0 ≤ bi ≤ y ≤ r, i = 1, . . . , I.
This equivalence is similarly argued as before. First, any
feasible solution to (36) is a feasible to (41) with y set at
the largest bi value. (Note, as before, the optimal solution
to (36) must satisfy bi ≤ r for all i.) Second, given a
feasible solution to (41), we must have∑
j 6=i1,...,if
bj ≥ r + fy − bi1 − · · · − bif
≥ r + fy − fy = r,
i.e., it satisfies the constraint in (36) as well.
Hence, we can solve the equivalent problem in (41)
as in the case of f = 1, for both convex and concave
cost functions. It is easy to see that, for both types
of cost functions, we must have y ≥ rI−f ; otherwise,
the problem is infeasible. For concave costs, we will
consider the intervals y ∈ [ rk−f , rk−f−1 ], for k = f +
2, . . . , I (assuming f ≤ I − 2, the case of f = I − 1
being trivial). For the k-th interval, the non-dominant
points are k − 1 distinct bi values set at y, and another
distinct bj set at r − (k − f − 1)y, with the total being
(k − 1)y + r − (k − f − 1)y = r + fy;
and 0 ≤ r − (k − f − 1)y ≤ y (i.e., bj is feasible), or
y ∈ [ rk−f , rk−f−1 ].
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We envision a free-market resource economy in which
peers buy and sell resources directly from each other. In
the context of a P2P resource market, we considered
the problem of optimal peer and rate selection. To our
knowledge, this is the first work that considers optimal
peer selection in a P2P resource market.
Throughout this paper we allowed for a natural pricing
function of the form ci(bi) · ti, where i indexes the peer
server, bi is the rate at which the server transmits bytes
to the client, and ti is the duration of the transfer. We
considered optimal peer selection for two broad classes
of problems: downloading and for streaming. For both
classes of problems we considered both convex and
concave cost functions.
For the downloading problem with concave cost func-
tions, we provided an explicit solution to the problem,
whereby all selected peers transmit at their maximum
rate ui. For convex cost functions we showed how the
problem can be easily solved with marginal analysis,
and that for many natural convex cost functions, all I
servers are selected, with none of the servers transmitting
at their maximal rates. We also found that in the Nash
equilibrium, each server sets its cost to the price per byte
that the client is willing to pay.
For the streaming problem, we showed that for prob-
lems of practical interest, rate segmentation can always
do as well as time segmentation. We then focused on rate
segmentation. We first considered the scenario in which
at most one server peer can fail. We then extended the
results to the scenario in which up to f server peers can
fail, for any value of f . We again analyzed both convex
and concave cases. We found that each case requires
a different methodology, although both cases are quite
tractable.
The contribution of our work is the development of
theoretical methodologies for these types of peer selec-
tion problems. We have formulated and solved a rich
array of optimal downloading and streaming problems.
The techniques presented here should be helpful in solv-
ing alternative formulations of peer selection problems.
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